Regional lobbying and structural funds: do regional representation offices in Brussels deliver? by Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés & Courty, Julie
  
Andrés Rodríguez-Pose and Julie Courty 
Regional lobbying and structural funds: do 
regional representation offices in Brussels 
deliver? 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés and Courty, Julie (2018) Regional lobbying and structural funds: do 
regional representation offices in Brussels deliver? Regional and Federal Studies, 28 (2). pp. 
199-229. ISSN 1359-7566  
DOI: 10.1080/13597566.2018.1441828 
 
© 2018 Informa UK Limited 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87587/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: April 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
1 
 
Regional lobbying and Structural funds. 
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Abstract: In recent years regional representation offices have proliferated in Brussels. Among 
the many aims of these offices are influencing the allocation and securing the transfer of 
European Structural and Cohesion funds to their respective regions. However, our knowledge 
about whether they have succeeded in this goal is limited. In this paper we assess the extent to 
which regional offices in Brussels have managed to affect the territorial commitment and 
payment of Structural and Cohesion funds for regional development beyond the main 
officially stated economic criteria of eligibility. The paper uses a custom-made survey of 
regional offices in Brussels, complemented by economic, institutional, and political data 
involving factors that should determine how much money is channelled to and disbursed in 
each region. The results of the Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variable analyses for a total of 
123 regions over the period 2009-2013 highlight that the capacity – proxied by the budget and 
staff of the office – of the regional representation offices to influence the commitment and 
payment of Structural and Cohesion funds has been negligible, when not outright negative. 
Regional lobbying in Brussels does not lead to more funds or to an easier disbursement of 
regional development funds. 
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1. Introduction  
 How the funds associated to any public policy are geographically distributed is rarely 
completely justified by the explicitly stated eligibility criteria. European policies, in general, 
and its largest policy in budgetary terms, the European regional development policy, in 
particular, are no exception to this. Many authors (e.g. Bouvet & Dall’erba, 2010; Bodenstein 
& Kemmerling, 2012; Chalmers, 2013) have stated that the official eligibility criteria are a 
necessary but insufficient condition to explain how the European Structural and Investment 
funds – which form the bulk of the funding of the European regional development policies – 
and the European Cohesion fund are allocated.  
One potential explanation for the distribution of the funds rests on the proliferation of regional 
representation offices in Brussels. Such offices have mushroomed, with more than 240 
European regions setting up shop in the European capital. Among the functions of the offices, 
the lobbying of European institutions in order to both get a greater share of the European pie 
and, increasingly, guarantee a timely disbursement of the committed funds is a more or less 
explicit objective. Regional officials in Brussels target the European Commission, as well as 
the Council, and Parliament, aiming to shape decisions about how much money is channelled 
to their regions. The Commission is lobbied, in particular, in order to make sure that the 
committed money is not withheld. Few policies are as attractive in this respect as the 
European regional development policy, one of the two most important European policies – 
with the agricultural policy – in budgetary terms. Hence, regional lobbying in Brussels could 
have contributed to alter the territorial allocation – both in terms of commitments and 
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payments – and the timing of the transfer of Structural and Cohesion funds, with the regions 
king the greatest lobbying effort gaining the most.
1
 
However, despite galloping regional lobbying and the multiplication of regional offices, there 
is limited knowledge about what role these offices have played in the transfer of European 
monies to regions. In particular, in the case of the European regional development policy, the 
analysis of the influence of regional offices is fundamentally limited to the work of Chalmers 
(2013), which concluded that “the lobbying capacity of regional offices did not appear to have 
an impact on the receipt of funds” (2013: 829). Chalmers (2013) was, however, more 
concerned with the capacity of decentralised regions to influence decision-making in Brussels 
than with the ‘effectiveness’ of regional representation offices in delivering greater ‘pork’ 
from the European Structural and Cohesion funds and in a timely manner. 
Our research aims to fill in this gap by asking to what extent the presence of regional 
representation offices in Brussels has influenced decisions about the territorial allocation of 
regional development funds and the timing of payments. It is assumed that the lobbying 
capacity of regions is directly related to the size of their representation in Brussels – proxied 
by the budget and staff of the office.
2
 
The analysis in this paper goes beyond previous research on several counts. First, it considers 
regional lobbying as the main object of the analysis and not as subsidiary to the overall 
autonomy awarded to a region. The economic eligibility criteria as well as institutional and 
political factors are also taken into account, but only in order to make sure that the factors 
                                                          
1
 The term allocation is used throughout the paper to refer to the amount of monetary resources assigned to or 
disbursed in a particular region. More specifically, commitments will refer to assignations, while payments to the 
actual amount of regional development and cohesion money transferred by the EU to a region in any given year. 
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The staff and budget size of the regional representation offices in Brussels do not necessarily capture all the 
lobbying efforts conducted by European regions in Brussels. Specific forms of lobbying are likely to be 
independent of the budget or staff size of the office. Similarly, not all regional lobbying in Brussels is channelled 
through the regional office. Hence, lobbying outcomes are in reality the result of a multitude of factors. These 
factors are, however, difficult to encapsulate with simple proxies applicable to a large number of regions. This 
leaves the budget and the staff size of the office as the more viable, minimum common denominator  proxies. 
4 
 
which should determine the allocation of funds do so in the expected way. Second, it 
distinguishes between two dimensions of the capacity of representation offices to lobby 
Brussels for Structural and Cohesion funding: the budget at the disposal of the regional office, 
as well as its staff. These data were gathered by means of a purpose-built questionnaire sent to 
every single regional office in Brussels. Third, it considers two phases in the regional policy 
decision-making processes: the commitment and payment stage, as regional lobbying can play 
different roles depending on the stage of the programming period. Methodologically, the 
paper is the first to explore the causality in the direction between regional lobbying and the 
allocation of Structural and Cohesion funds to regions by means of Instrumental Variable (IV) 
analysis. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines the rise of regional offices in Brussels, 
paying attention to how and when they have emerged, to the factors contributing to the 
establishment and dimension of an office, and to their functioning. Section 3 looks at whether, 
according to the existing literature, regional offices have delivered so far. Section 4 presents 
the methodology and data, while the results of the empirical analysis are introduced in section 
5. The conclusions and preliminary policy implications are developed in section 6. 
 
2. The rise of regional offices in Brussels 
 
2.1. Regional representation in Brussels  
 Like Washington in the US, Brussels has become a hotbed for lobbying. Interest 
groups aiming to influence the design of European policy have set up shop in the European 
capital in increasing numbers. In particular, the number of regional representation offices has 
soared, reaching close to 250 regional permanent representations in Brussels.  
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Although there are as many reasons behind the opening of permanent representations as the 
number of Brussels offices, part of the attention of many of these offices has been focused on 
the European regional development and cohesion policy. The money at stake – 350 billion 
euro for the period between 2014 and 2020 – has made Structural and Cohesion funds a juicy 
prospect for regional governments all over Europe and is a powerful motivation behind many 
decisions to establish a regional representation. Moreover, European integration has made it 
more difficult for Member States to block regions from engaging in policy competition. 
Indeed, the presence of a large regional development policy has triggered an increasing 
interest (and/or need) for a regional presence in Brussels. European integration has challenged 
the traditional role of the centralized state and cohesion policy has helped transform the role 
of regional authorities. Regional authorities increasingly represent territorial interests seeking 
to influence a wide array of EU policies, in general, and the European regional development 
policy, in particular (Beyers et al., 2015).  
The development of regional representation offices has been substantial and rapid. From 
modest origins,
3
 European regions have felt both compelled to gain influence over European 
policy-making and the regional distribution of funds via ‘ring-fencing demands’ (Tatham & 
Bauer, 2014: 1371) and to lower their perceived disempowerment through increased 
representation in Brussels. This has created an ‘opportunity structure’ (Tatham & Bauer, 
2014: 1368) for regions to make their voice heard. The propagation of liaison offices (Donas 
& Beyers, 2013) since the late 1980s has to be seen in this context and illustrates a 
progressive rise of regional demand for power.  
Currently more than two-thirds of EU regions have an office in Brussels (Tatham & Thau, 
2014). However, significant differences among countries remain. While all regions in a large 
                                                          
3
 Formal subnational representation in Brussels began with organizations assembling local and regional 
government interests, such as the Council of European Municipalities, founded in 1951. 
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number of countries (e.g. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, or 
Spain) are represented in Brussels, this is not the case for other countries (e.g. Bulgaria, 
Greece, Romania, or the United Kingdom) (Appendix 1). Regional offices also differ 
considerably in terms of staff and budget by country. According to our calculations, in the 
period between 2009 and 2013 there were 245 regional offices operating in Brussels. The 
average staff of each office was five and the average budget slightly above €400,000 per year 
(Appendix 1). These averages, however, hid considerable differences across countries. The 
Danish and Italian regional offices – both with more than €750,000 of average expenditure 
per annum – had the highest budgets. British and German offices also had budgets close to the 
€700,000 mark. By contrast, the eight Rumanian offices reported an average budget of only 
€70,000 (Appendix 1). Differences were also in evidence in terms of staff. The size of 
individual offices ranked between one (in a number of regions) and 30 employees (in the case 
of the Bavarian office). This is in line with previous studies on the subject, which tend to put 
the top range for Brussels offices at around the 30 employee mark (Blatter et al., 2008; Donas 
& Beyers, 2013; Tatham & Thau, 2014).
4
 Considerable differences existed by country. 
German offices, with an average of 16 staff (although this figure includes unpaid interns), 
boasted the highest number of workers. The sole Lithuanian and the Romanian 
representations had only one worker each. Overall, there has been a generalised will at 
regional level to be more directly represented in European affairs, but this has happened 
unevenly across regions and countries in terms of coverage, means, and power. 
2.2. Factors contributing to the establishment of regional representation in Brussels 
 The factors for the establishment of regional representation in Brussels are region- and 
country-specific. Nevertheless, some common denominators emerge. One key factor is 
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 For example, Blatter et al. (2008: 480) report a maximum of 28 staff members for the Bavarian office and 
Tatham & Thau (2014) put this figure at a maximum of 29 full time employees. 
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differences among countries in their degree of decentralisation and regional capacity to 
influence the process of European integration (Greenwood, 2011a). Generally speaking, 
regions from highly- and moderately-devolved countries are more able to create a link 
between the EU-level and the citizens in the regions (Greenwood, 2011b). Regions in these 
countries also have greater legitimacy and financial power to both open an office and flex 
their muscles in Brussels. Unsurprisingly, regions in highly decentralised countries (e.g. 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, or Spain) have the greatest regional representation in Brussels 
(Donas & Beyers, 2013): “Regional authority, self-rule and regional policy scope all increase 
the chance of regions having an office in Brussels” (Tatham & Thau, 2014: 264). Yet, even 
within this group differences in staff and budget are rife. German Länder enjoy larger budgets 
and staff, reflecting their more extensive involvement in national and European decision-
making processes, while Belgian and Spanish offices are more modest. Similarly, regions 
with a strong identity – such as Alsace, Bavaria, Brittany, Catalonia, or Scotland – and where 
“the economic, cultural and political regions […] coincide and are endowed with important 
institutions with legislative and administrative competences” (Keating et al., 2015: 446) also 
boast powerful regional representations. Regions with strong regionalist parties are also more 
likely to establish a permanent bureau in Brussels (Donas & Beyers, 2013). These three 
categories of regions have been, through their regional offices in Brussels, more capable of 
formulating and defending a coherent regional interest (Keating et al., 2015). 
This does not mean, however, that regions belonging to less decentralised countries have 
eschewed this process. Every single French region is represented in Brussels, with French 
regional offices growing from being – with the exceptions of Alsace or Bretagne – mainly 
symbolic representations in the early years (John, 2001) to becoming much more assertive of 
recent. A traditionally high level of centralisation in England did not prevent its regions from 
being among the first to establish offices in Brussels (John, 2001).  
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Regional wealth has been another driver behind decisions to open an office. Regional budgets 
affect the capacity of regions to engage with European policies (Tatham & Thau, 2014). 
Typically, regions in better-off countries (Denmark, Italy, Germany, or the UK) have larger 
and better endowed offices. By contrast, regions from poorer countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe make do with more modest delegations (Appendix 1). Belonging to a wealthy country 
does not, however, necessarily imply opening an office in Brussels or endowing it lavishly 
(Blatter & al., 2008).  
“While absolute resources are important for establishing a liaison office, subnational 
authorities with their own office are not necessarily the most prosperous in terms of 
relative resources. […] The GDP per capita of regions with an office is 28 percent 
lower than those regions without an office. This results from the fact that the most 
prosperous regions – in terms of GDP per capita – are not those with their own 
liaison office, but those who form a partial national association”. (Donas & Beyers, 
2013: 538). 
This may be also a consequence of the fact that wealthier regions generally have a greater 
influence on national politics and have traditionally worked hand-in-hand with their own 
national governments rather than circumventing them (Jeffery, 2007). This could explain why 
Finnish and Irish
5
 offices are relatively modest in comparison to those of countries with 
similar levels of wealth. Another potential reason has to do with the increasing will of regions 
to try to influence the amount and the timing of the payment of already committed funds 
during the cycle of a programming period. Most less developed regions, such as Podlaskie in 
Poland or Nord-Est in Romania, are under no illusion that they can make a huge influence on 
EU legislation. Their best chance, if at all, is through influencing the position of the Polish 
                                                          
5
 Although according to Callanan (2011; 2012), Irish subnational authorities tend to be neglected by central 
government. 
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and Romanian government respectively. However, as the gap between committed and actually 
disbursed funds channelled through the Cohesion and Structural and Investment programmes 
increases, the necessity of keeping an eye on the process rises as well. Hence, stemming from 
less well-off countries and having limited regional budgets has not prevented some regions 
from being present in Brussels, as indicated by the development of offices from Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland, and Romania. A similar discussion can be made concerning the most 
populous regions (Tatham & Thau, 2014). 
A final reason for the establishment of a permanent representation in Brussels is simple 
imitation or a ‘spill-over effect’ (Huysseune and Jans, 2008: 4). The successful – real or 
perceived – setting-up of a Brussels office may create a dynamic that is imitated by other 
subnational authorities (Huysseune and Jans, 2008: 4), leading to competition between 
regions.  
Overall, the opening of a Brussels office does not follow any precise rule, even if some 
common denominators can be identified. The spread of regional offices in Brussels signals a 
growing implication of the regional level with policy- and decision-making at a European 
scale which is, however, far from uniform (Hooghe, 1996).  
2.3. Modes of regional representation in Brussels   
“There is not, nor can there be, a single mode of representation of ‘regional’ interest in the 
EU” (Keating et al., 2015: 450). The motives change from region to region, country to 
country, and have evolved since the 1980s. A complex regional interest mix is behind 
decisions to set up permanent regional interests in Brussels and determines the modus 
operandi of each regional office.  
In what concerns regional development, many Brussels offices started with the aim of simply 
gathering information about Structural funds. This initial passive role gradually gave way to a 
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more active participation in trying to influence decisions about both commitment and 
payment of funds and, of recent, a more multifaceted approach has been normally adopted. 
Currently, many offices are not only engaged in attracting more public funds to their regions, 
but also seek greater involvement in the European regional development decision-making 
process. This implies a more diversified set of activities, structured around four main areas 
(Huysseune and Jans, 2008): a) information management; b) networking; c) fostering links 
between local/regional authorities and the EU; and d) influencing EU policies. 
Bypassing the central state authority is another reason for regional representation. This 
implies the resolve of regions to promote their own interests in Brussels without having to 
coordinate their actions with the central state or the national permanent representation. The 
capacity and/or interest by regions to follow this route are related to the balance between 
‘self-rule’ and ‘shared-rule’ (Hooghe et al., 2010: 5). ‘Self-rule’ refers to the ability of a 
region to “act autonomously”, whereas ‘shared-rule’ depicts the “capacity of a regional 
government to shape national decision making” (Hooghe et al., 2010: 9). Regions with greater 
self-rule and lower shared-rule have a greater incentive to show, through their Brussels 
offices, that the central state no longer monopolises external relations concerning Structural 
fund allocation: “the higher the level of devolution, the more frequently the [office] will 
bypass its member state” (Tatham, 2010: 78). However, the mere presence of regional 
representation in Brussels is not a sufficient condition to conclude that a region is trying to 
bypass its state (Tatham, 2010). More generally, Tatham reports that the level of devolution, 
the size of region, as well as its financial resources, its degree of exposure to the European 
integration process, and the existence of past conflicts with the central government are factors 
that shape the balance between bypassing or cooperating on regional development (Tatham, 
2010). From this point of view, it is interesting to note that in many cases (like for example 
11 
 
Germany or Spain) the combined workforce of all regional representations clearly exceeds 
that of their respective member states (Blatter et al., 2008).  
In a nutshell, the three driving forces behind the establishment of a Brussels office are a) the 
search for more funding in Structural funds or other types of regional investments and 
subsidies and a more full and timely disbursement of committed funds, b) the will to influence 
the political decision-making, and c) the desire by some regions to circumvent the authority of 
the central state in regional development matters. According to Marks et al. (2002), funding 
activities are among the most important activities of regional offices, but are not always 
associated with activities related to policy influence. This implies that while a few regional 
offices are concerned with all these motivations, most representations – because of budget or 
personnel constraints – are primarily or exclusively dedicated to one these three aspects. 
While making generalisations is difficult, if anything, poorer regions, first and foremost, use 
their Brussels office with the aim of lobbying for a greater share of regional funds (Marks et 
al., 2002), while simultaneously aiming to guarantee that the maximum amount of committed 
funds during a programming period is transferred in a timely manner. More prosperous 
regions, according to the results of our survey, are less concerned with fund allocation and 
more with influencing policy and circumventing national policies, as they receive far less 
from the regional development policy than less developed regions. As graphically put by one 
European Commission official under the condition of anonymity: “if you are Bavaria and you 
get very little from the EU Cohesion effort, you are much more interested in influencing 
policy. If you are Extremadura and the majority of your investment relies on Regional 
Development Funds, you lobby like crazy and you try to make sure that your smart 
specialisation strategy is approved from minute one”. As already pointed by Tatham (2008), 
less developed regions are more interested in hunting for European projects, while wealthier 
ones have normally a greater interest in influencing European public policy itself. 
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3. Do regional representation offices deliver greater Structural 
and Cohesion funds? 
Has the proliferation of regional representation offices in Brussels led to more Structural 
and Cohesion funding being channelled to their regions of origin? While the literature has 
explained the development of the Brussels regional office phenomenon, we know much less 
about whether regional representations have managed to achieve some of their objectives. In 
this paper, we address this gap in the literature, by focusing on a relatively common objective 
of regional representation offices in Brussels (and especially, as mentioned earlier, of those 
representing less developed regions): that of trying to influence the commitment and payment 
of Structural and Cohesion funds.  
European Structural funds represent a significant percentage of all public investment and can 
make a considerable difference for development, especially in the poorest European regions 
which receive the bulk of the funds (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004). The eligibility 
criteria for the commitment of the majority of funds – those channelled to the less developed 
regions – are simple, clear, and transparent, leaving, in theory at least, limited room for 
manoeuvre for lobbies to influence fund allocation. Yet, one of the objectives of the regional 
permanent representations is precisely this. Hence the question is: are regional offices 
effective in channelling more Structural funds to their respective regions and making sure that 
the transfer is done in a timely manner or are they irrelevant for this purpose? 
3.1. Criteria for the commitment of Structural funds 
The regional commitment of the traditional four Structural funds (the European Regional 
Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund, and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance) has been governed 
according to simple and transparent economic criteria. During the period of analysis (the 
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programming period 2007-2013), the distribution of funds was made according to three main 
objectives: 
1. Convergence objective: Regions with a GDP per capita below 75% of the EU average 
were eligible for this objective. The aim was to promote real convergence for the least-
developed EU regions. During the period 2007-2013, 84 regions and their 154 million 
inhabitants received almost 283 billion euros, or 81.5% of the total funding for 
regional development.  
2. Regional Competitiveness and Employment: This objective targeted industrial regions 
with a rate of unemployment above the EU average and had the aim of strengthening 
regional competitiveness, attractiveness, and employment. During the period 2007-
2013 55 billion euros (16% of the total) were earmarked to this objective, benefitting 
314 million people in 168 European regions. 
3. European Territorial Co-operation: Aimed at fostering cross-border and transnational 
cooperation, this objective commanded a mere 2.5% of the Structural fund budget or 
€8.7 billion. 
More than four-fifths of structural expenditure was thus targeted at the less developed regions, 
known then as ‘convergence’ regions,6 which were defined simply by their GDP per capita. 
During previous programming periods, the commitment process was also transparent and 
complied with a strict time framework. At the beginning of each funding period all central 
governments were required to produce a map aimed at determining which regions (at NUTS2 
level) were eligible for Structural funds. Several actors were involved in the commitment 
process. The European Commission first produced the Community Strategic Guidelines 
(CSG) and then divided the funds among member states (Chalmers, 2013). Once the 
                                                          
6
 Todays ‘less developed’ regions. 
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commitment was done, each member state, depending on its territorial structure and division 
of powers, worked more or less closely with the subnational authorities to decide the regional 
distribution of funds (Dellmuth, 2011). The actual allocation depended on what had been 
decided within the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF), agreed, as well, with the 
European Commission.  
This process left relatively little room for regional-level political bargaining. Lobbying mostly 
occurred prior to the provision of funds to the member states. This type of lobbying involved 
mainly member states, the Commission, and the Council, rather than subnational 
governments. Additional scope for influencing the territorial allocation of funds took place 
during the establishment of the Operational Programmes derived from the NSRF. According 
to Chalmers (2013: 818) “the main locus of lobbying [occurred] here”. However, lobbying 
often involved regions trying to influence national governments, rather than the European 
Commission. Such a structure limited direct interaction between subnational authorities and 
the EU, curtailing the capacity of regional offices in Brussels to affect decisions about the 
territorial distribution of funds.  
However, as argued by Bodenstein and Kemmerling (2012: 16), this was not always strictly 
the case, as the eligibility criteria were not sufficiently tight and left some leeway for national 
governments’ discretion. They also argue that the criteria of the different objectives never 
entirely explained the allocation of Structural funds (Bodenstein & Kemmerling, 2012; 
Munta, 2014). There were also windows of opportunity in the process for regional-level 
lobbying. The need for the Commission to approve the final regional commitment of funds 
provided some scope for regions to directly lobby Brussels officials (Dellmuth & Stoffel, 
2012). Moreover, subnational authorities had a greater capacity to sway funds allocated to the 
regional competitiveness and employment objective, where the criteria were less clear than in 
the convergence objective. This implies that, despite the essential intergovernmental nature of 
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the negotiations, every seven years regions mobilise to try to secure a bigger share of the pie 
(Giordano, 2006; Jaursch, 2013).  
Finally and most importantly, as with most public policies, there is a gap between the funds 
committed to each region and those actually spent. During the period of analysis, the gap 
between committed and paid funds for the regions included in the study was just shy of €30 
billion. This phenomenal difference between committed and actually disbursed funds 
provided a huge incentive for, particularly, less developed regions to actively lobby the 
European Commission in order to make sure that the gap is reduced and that the funding is 
transferred to the regions in a timely manner. This incentive is likely to be proportional to the 
amount of funds committed in Cohesion and Structural Funds. For Oberfranken in Germany 
which was allocated a total of €95 million during the period of analysis (and where the gap 
between committed and paid funds was €9 million), the incentives to lobby were small. For 
Podkarpackie in Poland, a region allocated in excess of €3.3 billion (and which had a shortfall 
of €620 million), the incentives were big. Yet, the gap between allocated and paid funds in 
Podkarpackie was much smaller than in, for example, in the case of Nord-Est in Romania. 
This region was allocated a total of €2.7 billion, but only close to €1.1 billion were actually 
paid until 2013. Much of it can be attributed to differences in capacity between Podkarpackie 
and Nord-Est, but a more visible and active presence of the Podkarpackie voivodship regional 
office in Brussels may have also played a part. Hence, although poorer regions received more 
funds than better-off regions, being poor alone did not entirely determine the way funds were 
disbursed (Kemmerling & Bodenstein, 2006).  
Trying to secure that committed funds are delivered in a complete and timely manner is, 
however, a factor that has been outside the radar of most research on regional lobbying in 
Europe. According to Marks et al. (2002: 2) the main areas of activity of regional offices have 
been “to gain information about funding opportunities for your region” and “to influence 
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decision-making in the EU in favor of your region”. ‘Influence EU decision-making’ and 
‘Information on funding’ also pop up as the main activities of regional offices in a later study 
by Tatham (2017). But while influencing decision-making is one of the activities that regional 
offices do in the run-up to the allocation of funds to regions before the beginning of every 
programming period (and, hence, in the commitment stage), the lobbying that is conducted 
during the programming period not only involves additional information on funding, but 
increasingly making sure that the committed monies are transferred and spent in the regions. 
In the next subsections we look in greater detail at the channels which determined – on top of 
the officially stated criteria – the allocation of Structural funds and what room was left for 
political bargaining. 
3.1.1. Institutional and political factors 
 According to Dellmuth (2011), regions with stronger institutions and quality of 
government
7
 benefitted from a disproportionally higher amount of funds than their weaker 
counterparts. Regions with sufficient experience and resources to spend the funds 
‘effectively’ may have been recipients of a higher share of funds that what they would have 
received, had the official allocation criteria been applied strictly (Dellmuth, 2011). Greater 
institutional autonomy under a federal system and more efficient governments may have thus 
favoured the German Länder or Spanish regions, relative to regions in more centralised states, 
in their quest for Structural funds (Bodenstein & Kemmerling, 2012). Conversely, 
institutionally weaker regions may have had to gain the European Commission’s trust by 
building a ‘reputation’ as worthy managers of public policies in order to receive funds 
(Dellmuth, 2011: 1017).  
                                                          
7
 What can be considered as stronger institutions, particularly at the regional level, has been shrouded in 
controversy (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013), although considerable progress has been made in this respect in recent 
years (e.g. Charron et al., 2014). 
17 
 
Political criteria also played a role, but not necessarily in the same direction as institutional 
criteria. Poorer regions may have had some advantage, as the electoral returns of spending 
funds are likely to be higher in poorer than in richer areas: politicians “receive more votes per 
euro invested in poor than in rich districts” (Dellmuth & Stoffel, 2012: 419). Regions voting 
in national elections in favour of incumbent European Parliament majorities have also been 
censed to have received more than their fair share of Structural funds (Bodenstein & 
Kemmerling, 2012). “Regional party alignment with the national party” may have shaped the 
Structural fund commitment process (Chalmers, 2013: 829). 
3.1.2. Economic factors 
 In addition to the institutional and political factors, a number of regional and member-
state economic characteristics count in the allocation of Structural funds. First and foremost is 
the main criterion for the allocation of the bulk of the funds: GDP per capita. Given the 75% 
rule for achieving the greatest level of support, the lower the GDP of a region, the higher the 
per capita allocation of funds (Dellmuth & Stoffel, 2012). Structural issues, such as regional 
unemployment levels and the industrial structure of a territory may have also played a role 
under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment objective (Bouvet & Dall’erba, 2010). 
This view, however, is not always supported by all research as, according to Bodenstein & 
Kemmerling (2012: 16), “structural problems (like unemployment) play an ambivalent role: it 
increases the need of Structural Funds, but also decreases the capacity of regions in actually 
acquiring them” (Bodenstein & Kemmerling, 2012: 16). 
3.2. Can regional offices influence the allocation of Structural and Cohesion funds?  
Has the presence of regional representation offices contributed to shape the distribution and 
payment of European Structural funds? There is still a dearth of research considering whether 
regions have successfully lobbied European institutions – mainly the European Commission, 
18 
 
but also the Council and the Parliament – in order to gain a share of the funds beyond those 
that would have been allocated to them following strict economic criteria or to guarantee a 
timely and complete payment of funds.  
The most thorough and up-to-date analysis of the lobbying efficacy of regional offices in 
Brussels has been conducted by Chalmers (2013). Chalmers (2013: 827), in order to explain 
the impact of regional authority, collected regional data for six variables, including the 
presence of a Brussels office. His data on regional representation in Brussels contained two 
dimensions: the staff size and the age of the office. His results point to the fact that the 
success of regional lobbying strategies in Brussels is generally determined by two factors: the 
institutional power of the region at a national level and its presence in Brussels office 
(Chalmers, 2013). The more institutionalised and the stronger the region, the greater the 
capacity it has to influence the allocation of Structural funds. However, when subnational 
authorities are too strong, leading to conflict with the state, this conflict undermines the 
effectiveness of the regional lobbying (Chalmers, 2013). Yet, despite the relevance of having 
a Brussels presence, neither the size of the staff (Chalmers, 2013; Beyers et al., 2015) nor the 
age of the office (Chalmers, 2013) seemed to determine to any extent the distribution of 
Structural funds.  
On the whole, while Chalmers (2013) analysis represents an important breakthrough in our 
understanding of how the presence of a regional office in Brussels shapes the allocation of 
Structural funds, many questions remain as to whether and to which extent the presence of 
regional offices in Brussels affects the allocation of European Structural funds. The following 
section will precisely address these questions, going beyond Chalmers (2013), by 
distinguishing between committed and paid funds, including not just the size of regional 
offices, but also their budgets, and checking the robustness of fixed-effect panel econometric 
19 
 
results through Instrumental Variable (IV) analysis in order to ascertain the causality of the 
relationship.  
 
4. Data and Methodology  
 
4.1. The model 
 In order to assess whether and the extent to which regional lobbying in Brussels 
affects the allocation – both commitment and payment – of Structural and Cohesion funds, we 
estimate different versions of the following simple model, which reproduces the theoretical 
discussion above: 
 yi,t = α + β1ROi,t + β2ECi,t + θIPi,t + ui,t (1) 
Where: 
y represents the amount of regional funds – committed or actually paid – 
relative to the wealth of region i at time t; 
RO depicts the dimension of a regional office in Brussels – measured by 
its staff and budget; 
EC represents the basic economic criteria behind the allocation of 
Structural funds – regional GDP per head (for the Convergence 
objective) and unemployment rate (for the Regional Competitiveness 
and Employment objective), as well as population density; 
IP is a vector of institutional and political factors, including corruption 
levels and the degree of regional autonomy, which may affect the 
allocation of funds; 
u is the correspondent residual term; 
i,t depict region and time, respectively. 
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4.2. The variables 
4.2.1. Dependent variable 
 The dependent variable is the amount of Structural and Cohesion funds committed or 
actually paid to a region in a given year between 2009 and 2013, relative to the region’s 
wealth – proxied by its GDP per head. Commitments and payments include those made 
through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), 
the European Agricultural Guidance Fund (EAGGF), the Financial Instrument for Fisheries 
Guidance FIFG), as well as the Cohesion Fund. Considering both commitments and payments 
responds to the fact that regional lobbying activities fundamentally take place in two stages: 
a) during the initial negotiation between member states and the European Commission before 
the start of each programming period, determining the commitments and b) over the duration 
of the programming period, when the European Union has to disburse the payments, 
determining payments. The division between commitments and payments allows to better 
capture the effectiveness of regional offices in Brussels at the two main stages of the lobbying 
process. Our hypothesis is that the impact of regional lobbying on these two variables may 
differ substantially: regions may be awarded more room for manoeuvre at the payment than at 
the commitment stage. The source of the data is the European Commission. The dependent 
variables are included in the analysis using natural logarithms. 
4.2.2. The variables of interest: regional office budget and staff 
Two dimensions of the main independent variable of interest are considered: the 
annual budget and the staff of each regional office in Brussels.
8
 The budget measures the 
financial resources of an office aimed at covering both its operational costs as well as its 
                                                          
8
 The staff and budget of a region’s office represent proxies for the effort that individual European regions are 
putting into their representation in Brussels. Ideally, some indication of leadership and initiative of the regional 
office staff could have provided a better indication of the effectiveness of regional offices. However, those types 
of data are subjective and difficult to obtain for a large number of regions. 
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lobbying activities. There are two main channels through which regional delegations in 
Brussels are funded. In most cases an entry of the region’s budget is dedicated to the funding 
of the regional representation office in Brussels. Some regional offices also raise their own 
revenue from some of the activities they carry out. Given the variability of particularly own 
sources of revenue, the budget of a regional office in Brussels may oscillate from one year to 
another.  
These data are not publicly available for all offices and were gathered by means of a simple 
survey sent to all Brussels representation offices. A total of 245 offices were at first contacted 
by email in 2015, asking specifically about the number of staff working in the office and 
about its budget. Recent yearly variations in staff and budget were also requested. After a 
relatively low response rate in the first instance, a second email followed. The emails were 
complemented by telephone interviews of those offices that had not provided an email 
response. The telephone interviews were also used in order to gather additional information 
about the specific activities of the office regarding Structural and Cohesion funds. The 
telephone interviews covered the second half of 2015 and 2016. Information for a total of 92 
regional offices was gathered in this way (37% response rate). For other regional offices, 
basic staff and budget information was extracted from the European Transparency Register.
9
 
This raised the total to 123 regional offices from 26 EU member states. The NUTS2 regions 
covered in the analysis are presented in the Appendix 2. The budget and staff data are 
expressed in ratios of regional GDP per capita and logged. This is aimed at depicting the 
relative effort made by each region in the setup of its Brussels office. The link between the 
size of the Brussels offices and the distribution of funds is presented in Appendix 3. 
                                                          
9
 Two potential caveats of the analysis must be noted. First, all the information is self-reported. We had little 
control over who in the regional office replied to the emails and provided the information. The same applies to 
the telephone interviews. Second, issues of reliability have been raised about the European Transparency 
Register, meaning that some of the information contained there could be the only officially available, but 
inaccurate. 
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4.2.3. The economic criteria  
As indicated earlier, the allocation of European Structural funds follows a series of 
economic eligibility criteria. First and foremost is GDP per capita, which is the EU’s official 
benchmark to classify regions as less developed. Lagging regions – the former Objective 1 or 
convergence regions (defined as those with a GDP per person measured in purchasing power 
parity below 75% of the EU average) – receive four-fifths of the funds. Given that regional 
wealth is the single most important criterion for the allocation of regional development funds, 
a negative relationship between a region's GDP per capita and the allocation of Structural 
funds is envisaged. Most of the literature is in line with this expectation (Dellmuth, 2011; 
Dellmuth & Stoffel, 2012; Tatham & Thau, 2014). GDP per head has been logged in order to 
normalize distribution. 
Unemployment may also affect the distribution of regional funds. The Structural and Cohesion 
funds target regions with structural problems. Unemployment rates are a key gauge of 
structural problems and have been explicitly used in the past (former Objective 2 or Regional 
Competitiveness and Employment regions) as a direct criterion for the commitment of funds. 
Higher levels of unemployment are therefore expected to be positively associated with the 
amount of Structural funds received by a region (Bodenstein and Kemmerling, 2012). 
The density of a region also affects the territorial distribution of funds. In more densely 
populated and in highly urbanised regions the cost per head or per unit of GDP of providing 
most public goods is significantly lower than in more scarcely populated areas. Consequently, 
“densely populated areas receive less funding than do sparsely populated ones” (ESPON, 
2005: 82). The variable has been logged to normalize the distribution. 
  
23 
 
4.2.4. Institutional and political factors  
Institutional and political criteria may also influence the allocation of funds. The real 
or perceived level of corruption in a region and, in particular, the misuse of Structural funds 
for self-serving purposes by decision-makers can affect the future distribution of funds. As 
indicated by Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo (2015: 1276) “unaccountable and poorly staffed 
governments and governments with inept and/or corrupt politicians at the helm will […] 
deliver inefficient policies or, worse still, lead to situations where rent-seeking and insider–
outsider problems are pervasive”. This creates problems of absorptive capacity and may, in 
exceptional circumstances, result in the freezing of funds or in sanctions. All these factors are 
at the root of the gap between committed and actually paid funds in many less developed 
regions – which also tend to be the most corrupt. The main problem is, however, measuring 
corruption at the regional level in Europe. To do this we resort to the work of Charron et al. 
(2014) who assess the subjective perception of regional corruption by means of a survey of 
34,000 Europeans. The resulting corruption index is used in the analysis as our indicator of 
local graft.  
The degree of regional autonomy can also affect how much money is channelled to a given 
region. Regional governments try to influence investment decisions and shape policy 
processes which may affect them directly. The greater the level of autonomy, the greater the 
likelihood that a regional government may have a say in the allocation of Structural funds. 
This influence can be exercised via two channels: self-rule and shared-rule (Hooghe et al., 
2008). Self-rule represents the actual powers of a regional authority over the citizens of a 
region, whereas shared-rule refers to the capacity of regional governments to influence 
decision-making beyond the borders of the region. 
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A Table describing all the variables used in the analysis, as well as their sources and expected 
coefficients can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
5. Results  
The results of the analyses involving the 123 European regions from 26 member states 
are presented in this section. Data on both the budget and staff were selected for each of the 
regions for each year in the period between 2009 and 2013. These data were linked in the 
analysis to the funds committed to each region, as well as those that were actually disbursed 
in each year.  
The results of the fixed effects (FE) panel data analysis with robust standard errors are 
presented in section 5.1, while the coefficients in section 5.2 denote the results of the 
instrumental variable (IV) regressions addressing potential endogeneity problems. 
5.1. Fixed effects analysis 
The results of the fixed effects analysis are presented in Table 1. Two different 
versions of Model (1) are calculated, substituting the independent variable of interest – the 
dimension of a region’s Brussels office – with its two proxies: the regional office budget and 
its staff. The analysis is conducted taking into account both the actual funds committed on an 
annual basis at the beginning of the programming period 2007-2013, as well as the yearly 
payments which effectively took place. The regressions include time fixed effects in order to 
take into account specific annual shocks which may affect either the funds allocated to 
regional development, as well as the size of the Brussels office. 
The coefficients in Table 1 indicate that the allocation of Structural and Cohesion funds 
during the period of analysis has nothing to do with the lobbying capacity of Brussels regional 
offices, proxied by the budget of the offices. All the coefficients for the regional office budget 
25 
 
variable are insignificant, with the exception of regression (5), which displays a negative and 
significant coefficient at the 10% level.  
The coefficient for the size of the Brussels regional office, proxied by its staff, is by contrast 
always negative and significant, regardless of whether the committed (Table 1, regressions 3 
and 4) or paid funds (Table 1, regressions 7 and 8) are considered. Hence, regions with a 
bigger staff in their Brussels office have neither been capable of gaining a greater share of 
funds for their regions nor have they managed to make sure that payment takes place in a 
more complete and timely manner, once the factors that should determine the allocation of 
funds are controlled for. Regions making the greatest lobbying effort have de facto attracted 
fewer funds per capita relative to their level of wealth. 
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 Table 1. The link between the size of the Brussels office (budget and staff) and the allocation of Structural funds. Fixed effects (FE) analysis.  
 Committed Funds Paid Funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Office Budget Office Budget Staff Staff Office Budget Office Budget Staff Staff 
         
Budget -0.0144 -0.000771   -0.0630* -0.0377   
 (0.0152) (0.00928)   (0.0345) (0.0282)   
Staff   -0.483*** -0.262***   -1.068*** -0.795*** 
   (0.156) (0.0952)   (0.311) (0.282) 
GDP per capita -1.098*** -1.103*** -1.130*** -1.117*** -1.094*** -1.078*** -1.164*** -1.121*** 
 (0.0350) (0.0260) (0.0222) (0.0214) (0.0805) (0.0760) (0.0853) (0.0819) 
Unemployment  -0.0124** -0.0142*** -0.0113** -0.0138** 0.0451*** 0.0419*** 0.0476*** 0.0430*** 
 (0.00576) (0.00539) (0.00567) (0.00541) (0.0111) (0.0103) (0.0113) (0.0104) 
Density -0.0287 -0.00962 -0.0346 -0.0129 -0.0141 0.00780 -0.0264 -0.00138 
 (0.0214) (0.0149) (0.0212) (0.0140) (0.0374) (0.0382) (0.0374) (0.0382) 
Corruption  -0.0328  -0.0315  0.222  0.222 
  (0.0693)  (0.0692)  (0.238)  (0.236) 
Self-Rule  0.163***  0.157***  0.457***  0.443*** 
  (0.0212)  (0.0214)  (0.0492)  (0.0496) 
Shared-Rule  -0.00967  -0.0110  0.740***  0.739*** 
  (0.0180)  (0.0179)  (0.104)  (0.103) 
Constant 19.54*** 18.22*** 20.09*** 18.56*** 18.30*** 12.64*** 19.41*** 13.53*** 
 (0.352) (0.324) (0.275) (0.314) (0.803) (1.086) (0.956) (1.230) 
         
Observations 610 578 610 578 610 578 610 578 
Number of regions 122 117 122 117 122 117 122 117 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R
2
 within 0.820 0.907 0.824 0.908 0.370 0.414 0.375 0.417 
R
2
 between 0.709 0.0942 0.599 0.140 0.617 0.131 0.400 0.124 
R
2
 overall 0.685 0.121 0.597 0.165 0.580 0.108 0.397 0.102 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1 reveals that regional funds were, by and large, allocated following the economic 
criteria which govern the distribution of the funds. In particular, the GDP per capita of a 
region, the single most important condition – following the principle of concentration – for 
the distribution of funds, emerges as the fundamental driver of the amount of funds 
channelled to any given territory, both in terms of commitments and payments. The 
coefficient for GDP per capita is in all eight regressions negative and significant at the 1% 
level, indicating that poorer regions benefited from the greatest influx of resources. It is also 
by far the strongest coefficient. The strength of the GDP per capita coefficient can also 
provide a potential explanation for the insignificant or negative coefficients of the variables of 
interest. If the allocation of Structural and Cohesion funds follows in a strict way a regional 
development criterion – as seems to be indicated by the GDP per capita coefficient – putting 
more resources, in the form of greater budgets or staff, at the disposal of regional 
representation offices in Brussels can be futile for swaying the allocation of Structural and 
Cohesion funds. In the end, their allocation fundamentally follows the stated objectives and 
depends on an easily measurable and transparent economic indicator: GDP per capita. 
Another potential explanation is that better staffed offices with bigger budgets may be 
concerned with a multitude of different tasks – like, for example, influencing EU legislation – 
possibly neglecting or paying less attention to matters related to EU regional development 
funding (Tatham, 2008). 
Other economic criteria also affected the distribution of funds. Unemployment is the only 
economic criterion that seems to influence the allocation of funds in a different way when we 
consider committed or paid funds. In contrast to expectations, higher levels of regional 
unemployment led to a lower commitment of regional funds per capita than in regions with 
lower unemployment rates (Table 1, regressions 1 to 4). In this case, this result is probably 
determined by the fact that the levels of GDP per capita are a far more important factor in the 
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distribution of Structural funds and, consequently, trump unemployment as the main criterion 
behind how much money is allocated to each region. However, when the actual paid funds are 
considered, the unemployment rate becomes positive and significant at the 1% level (Table 1, 
regressions 5 to 8). This may imply that regions with higher unemployment problems are 
more effective at lobbying the European Commission at the time of payment than when the 
allocation of funds is decided. It is also more likely that the Commission could have been 
sensitive to the need of either regions with persistent unemployment problems or to those that 
have seen their levels of unemployment rise since the funds were committed before 2007 – as 
was the case of many lagging regions during the crisis that followed 2008 –, channelling a 
greater amount of funds to these regions at the time of payment. The coefficients for the 
density variable are, with no exception, negative (signalling that more densely populated 
regions, have received less funding per capita, as expected) but insignificant.  
Of the political and institutional variables, regional levels of corruption are disconnected from 
the distribution of funds, but that is not the case for the level of decentralisation. Regions with 
a greater degree of self-rule received more funds than regions with lower levels of autonomy, 
both at the commitment and payment stages, as indicated by the positive and significant 
coefficients (Table 1, regressions 2, 4, 6, and 8). Shared-rule, or the capacity to influence 
national and European decision-making, proved to be more influential at the payment stage 
(Table 1, regressions 6 and 8). 
5.2. Instrumental variable analysis 
So far, the results of the FE analysis underline that, once the economic criteria that 
should determine the allocation of Structural and Cohesion funds to regions as well as the 
level of decentralisation are controlled for, regional lobbying has no connection or even a 
detrimental one with how the funds are distributed. However, potential endogeneity issues 
mean that, at this stage, we should be coy about interpreting the results indicating a lack of 
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influence of regional lobbying on the territorial distribution of regional development funds. 
The relationship can run both ways: regional lobbying may influence where funds are 
allocated by the EU, but a greater or lower provision of funds to a given region may 
determine the amount of resources it devotes to further lobbying. This potential problem of 
endogeneity has important econometric implications, as omitted factors affecting the 
distribution of funds may also influence the lobbying behaviour of regions and their desire to 
spend more or less resources in opening and managing a Brussels regional office. This issue is 
traditionally addressed in applied econometrics by means of an IV analysis. Finding 
instruments to deal with this type of simultaneous causation is not always easy, as the 
instrument must affect the lobbying effort, but be independent from the disturbance in model 
(1). In other words, it cannot be a factor determining the regional allocation of Structural 
funds. Fortunately, in this case a series factors relating to the size of the region may shape the 
capacity of regions to use more funds for lobbying Brussels officials, without necessarily 
having an influence on the amount of funds allocated to the region. Regions with a larger 
population and GDP, and/or a greater share of employment normally have more resources at 
their disposal to start and maintain their officers in Brussels relative to smaller ones. 
However, size is not necessarily a determining factor behind the allocation of funds as large 
regions can either be rich or poor.  
After controlling for different dimensions of a region’s size, the regional employment rate is 
the instrument that is most significantly associated with the budget allocated to Brussels 
regional offices, while the population of the region has the strongest connection with the 
office staff. This is corroborated by the F-statistics in the first stage regressions. The F-
statistics fulfil the criteria of the theory of weak instruments, remaining above the threshold of 
10 in cases of a single endogenous regressor (Staiger and Stock, 1997). The partial R
2
 and the 
fact that both population and employment rates have a positive and statistically significant 
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effect on the staff and budget of Brussels regional offices respectively confirms the validity of 
the instruments. The first stage regressions prove that both a regional employment rate and its 
population respectively are significantly connected to the budget and the staff of a regional 
office in Brussels.
10
  
The results of the second stage regressions are presented in Table 2. Following the strategy of 
the FE analysis, Table 2 presents the results considering both the regional office budget and 
its staff. 
The results of the IV analysis reproduce to a large extent those of the FE analysis. Regarding 
the variables of interest, the coefficient of the size of the budget of the Brussels office 
remains, as was the case in Table 1, insignificant. In the case of the staff of the Brussels 
office, the results of the IV analysis confirm the strong negative impact of large offices on the 
allocation of regional funds. This negative impact emerges both at the stage of committing the 
funds as well as when the funds are paid. All the coefficients for the size of the Brussels office 
staff in Table 2 are negative and significant at the 1% level. Hence, once the economic criteria 
behind the allocation of funds are controlled for, having more staff in Brussels has led to 
lower financial resources allocated to the relevant region. 
The allocation of funds relative to the wealth of the region was fundamentally determined by 
economic criteria. The GDP per capita of the region was the main factor governing how much 
a region received in Structural and Cohesion funds. The coefficient is negative and significant 
at the 1% level in all eight regressions (Table 2). The coefficient of the unemployment rate 
reflects that of Table 1: regions with greater unemployment levels received less funds per 
capita at the commitment stage, but more at the payment stage. Density, which displayed 
negative but insignificant coefficient in Table 1, becomes negative and significant in those 
regressions considering the staff of the Brussels office as a proxy for a region’s lobbying 
                                                          
10
 The first stage regressions can be made available upon request. 
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capacity (Table 2, regressions 3, 4, 7, and 8). Regions with a higher density are allocated less 
financial resources per capita for regional development.  
The influence of regional autonomy on the territorial distribution of funds is, however, 
weakened. The degree of self-rule remains a critical factor behind the resources allocated to a 
region at the commitment and payment stages, when the budget of the office is chosen as the 
proxy for lobbying capacity (Table 2, regressions 2 and 6), while the coefficient for shared-
rule is only significant at the payment stage (Table 2, regression 6).  
Overall, the IV analysis reinforces the role of the GDP per capita of a region as the main 
determinant of the territorial allocation of funds, both at the commitment and payment stages, 
sending a strong sign that the distribution of funds is conducted ‘by the book’. 
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Table 2. The link between the size of the Brussels office (budget and staff) and the allocation of Structural funds. Instrumental variable (IV) analysis.  
 Committed Funds Paid Funds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Office Budget Office Budget Staff Staff Office Budget Office Budget Staff Staff 
         
Budget -0.844 -0.000677   -1.818 1.030   
 (0.752) (0.322)   (1.946) (1.636)   
Staff   -3.936*** -3.767***   -9.815*** -11.51*** 
   (0.840) (0.915)   (2.406) (3.112) 
GDP per capita -1.139*** -1.100*** -1.366*** -1.315*** -1.173*** -1.018*** -1.762*** -1.727*** 
 (0.0565) (0.0216) (0.0670) (0.0597) (0.146) (0.110) (0.192) (0.203) 
Unemployment  -0.0169*** -0.0164*** -0.00396 -0.00957** 0.0387** 0.0475*** 0.0663*** 0.0560*** 
 (0.00625) (0.00265) (0.00504) (0.00447) (0.0162) (0.0135) (0.0144) (0.0152) 
Density -0.0362 -0.00129 -0.078*** -0.057*** -0.0470 0.0312 -0.137** -0.135* 
 (0.0294) (0.0121) (0.0241) (0.0216) (0.0762) (0.0616) (0.0689) (0.0736) 
Corruption  -0.0857  -0.0115  0.169  0.283 
  (0.0642)  (0.0822)  (0.327)  (0.280) 
Self-Rule  0.163***  0.0880  0.523**  0.231 
  (0.0491)  (0.0845)  (0.250)  (0.288) 
Shared-Rule  -0.0197  -0.0298  0.849**  0.681 
  (0.0736)  (0.122)  (0.374)  (0.417) 
Constant 22.08*** 18.29*** 24.31*** 23.09*** 23.57*** 8.795 30.12*** 27.40*** 
 (2.332) (1.255) (1.085) (1.432) (6.036) (6.382) (3.109) (4.872) 
         
Observations 583 552 610 578 583 552 610 578 
Number of regions 119 114 122 117 119 114 122 117 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R
2
 within 0.534 0.923 0.651 0.742 . 0.191 . . 
R
2
 between 0.147 0.162 0.139 0.105 0.0634 0.115 0.0564 0.000776 
R
2
 overall 0.147 0.195 0.148 0.110 0.0593 0.0930 0.0559 0.000796 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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6. Conclusion and policy implications 
 
Regional representation offices have proliferated in Brussels in recent years. While 
these offices fulfil many tasks, one of their main objectives has been and remains influencing 
European policy and maximising the allocation of European Structural and Cohesion funds to 
their region of origin. But is this effort paying-off? Have regional offices in Brussels managed 
to influence the allocation of Structural funds in favour of those regions with a greater 
presence in Brussels? In this paper we have measured whether this is the case by examining 
the extent to which the budget and staff size of regional representation offices affect the 
allocation of Structural funds both at the commitment and payment stages. 
Overall, the results of the analysis indicate that regional offices have had a negligible effect 
on the distribution of regional development funds. Bigger offices in Brussels did not 
necessarily lead to greater shares of funding going to the regions that made the biggest effort 
to lobby Brussels in situ. Nor did they guarantee a more complete and timely payment of 
previously committed funds. In some cases, the efforts have even proven detrimental as more 
lavishly staffed Brussels offices are linked with less funds channelled to the region, both at 
the commitment and payment stages.  
The territorial distribution of funds has, to a large extent, followed the transparent criteria of 
regional wealth and unemployment which, according to the stated objectives of the European 
regional development policy, should be the factors driving how much money is allocated to a 
particular region. Our results also find that, although regional autonomy and the capacity of 
decentralised regional governments to shape policies within and outside their region often 
play a role in the distribution of funds, this role is smaller than that identified by Chalmers 
(2013), especially when the direction of causality is controlled for. The role of regional 
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autonomy in the allocation of funds is dwarfed by that of the economic criteria at the heart of 
the regional policy. We also find that regional corruption levels bear no influence whatsoever 
in the territorial distribution of funds. 
Hence, the answer to the questions driving this research is that regional representation offices 
have so far had virtually no influence in shaping the distribution of the funds of what is 
currently the largest policy in the EU, at least in budgetary terms. This is particularly true at 
the stage of committing the funds. Levels of regional unemployment play a much greater role 
when the funds are actually disbursed, although there is no sign that this is a consequence of 
the lobbying efforts of regional offices. It is likely to respond to a genuine concern by the EU 
with high levels of unemployment, particularly at a time of crisis which was not predicted 
when the funding commitments were made. 
Consequently, although it may be the case that the official economic eligibility criteria are a 
necessary but insufficient conditions in explaining the full Structural funds allocation (Bouvet 
& Dall’erba, 2010; Bodenstein & Kemmerling, 2012; Chalmers, 2013), this explanation does 
not seem to come from the efforts of regional representation offices in Brussels. 
The overall result should however not lead to the conclusion that having a permanent 
representation office in Brussels has no added value for a region. Regional representation 
offices in Brussels may have contributed to better information management, networking, or 
the establishment of greater links with different EU Commission Directorates (Huysseune and 
Jans, 2008), activities which have not been assessed by the current study. What has been 
simply demonstrated here is that big budgets and staff in a Brussels regional office do not 
guarantee favours in terms of regional development funding. Hence, there may be a need to 
reconsider the role of representation offices away from directly lobbying for European 
regional policy funding and towards trying to have a greater influence on the decision-making 
on topics directly affecting one’s region and to becoming a more effective information vehicle 
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between the ‘Eurosphere’ and regional authorities. Some of the oldest offices may have 
already understood that a shift in priorities is necessary, although many others and the 
regional governments that fund them – and especially those of regions highly dependent on 
Structural funding – may still have not realised or accurately conveyed that their capacity to 
influence the territorial allocation of funding may be smaller than what was expected in the 
first place. 
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Appendix 1 
Average budget and staff of regional offices in Brussels by country (2009-2013) 
 
ID 
Average 
Budget 
Average 
Staff 
Number of regional offices 
AT  .  . 9 
BE         312 000.00 €  7 12 
BG  .  . 6 
CY         336 185.60 €  4 1 
CZ         285 000.00 €  3 8 
DE         673 325.00 €  16 38 
DK         786 382.72 €  7 5 
EL  .  . 13 
ES         500 893.99 €  9 19 
FI         290 888.89 €  3 6 
FR         508 506.75 €  5 26 
HR  .  . 2 
HU         200 000.00 €  2 7 
IE         200 000.00 €  2 2 
IT         757 083.18 €  7 21 
LT         125 000.00 €  1 1 
LU  .  . 1 
LV  .  . 1 
MT  .  . 1 
NL         472 800.00 €  2 13 
PL         140 566.04 €  4 16 
PT  .  . 7 
RO           70 000.00 €  1 8 
SE         526 250.00 €  3 8 
SI  .  . 2 
SK  .  . 4 
UK          683 796.75 €  5 8 
Average         404 039.94 €  5 245 
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Appendix 2 
Regions for which data on staff size and budget were available 
 
Country Code Country Region Code Name of the Region 
AT Austria AT13 Wien 
AT33 Tirol 
AT34 Vorarlberg 
BE Belgium BE21 Prov. Antwerpen 
BE23 Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen 
BG Bulgaria BG31 Severozapaden 
BG32 Severen tsentralen 
BG33 Severoiztochen 
BG34 Yugoiztochen 
BG41 Yugozapaden 
BG42 Yuzhen tsentralen 
CY Cyprus CY00 Kýpros 
CZ Czech 
Republich 
CZ01 Praha 
CZ04 Severozápad 
CZ05 Severovýchod 
CZ06 Jihovýchod 
DE Germany DE11 Stuttgart 
DE12 Karlsruhe 
DE13 Freiburg 
DE14 Tübingen 
DE21 Oberbayern 
DE22 Niederbayern 
DE23 Oberpfalz 
DE24 Oberfranken 
DE25 Mittelfranken 
DE26 Unterfranken 
DE27 Schwaben 
DE91 Braunschweig 
DE92 Hannover 
DE93 Lüneburg 
DE94 Weser-Ems 
DEE0 Sachsen-Anhalt 
DK01 Hovedstaden 
DK02 Sjælland 
DK03 Syddanmark 
EE Estonia EE00 Eesti 
EL Greece EL12 Kentriki Makedonia 
EL13 Dytiki Makedonia 
EL14 Thessalia 
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EL22 Ionia Nisia 
EL23 Dytiki Ellada 
EL24 Sterea Ellada 
EL25 Peloponnisos 
EL30 Attiki 
EL41 Voreio Aigaio 
EL42 Notio Aigaio 
EL43 Kriti 
ES Spain ES11 Galicia 
ES21 País Vasco 
ES30 Comunidad de Madrid 
ES61 Andalucía 
ES63 Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta 
ES64 Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla 
ES70 Canarias 
FI Finland FI19 Länsi-Suomi 
FI1D Pohjois- ja Itä-Suomi 
FI20 Åland 
FR France FR10 Île de France 
FR26 Bourgogne 
FR42 Alsace 
FR43 Franche-Comté 
FR63 Limousin 
HR Croatia HR03 Jadranska Hrvatska 
HR04 Kontinentalna Hrvatska 
HU Hungary HU10 Közép-Magyarország 
HU21 Közép-Dunántúl 
HU31 Észak-Magyarország 
HU33 Dél-Alföld 
IE Ireland IE01 Border, Midland and Western 
IE02 Southern and Eastern 
IT Italy ITF1 Abruzzo 
ITH5 Emilia-Romagna 
ITI1 Toscana 
LT Lithuania LT00 Lietuva 
LU Luxembourg LU00 Luxembourg 
LV Latvia LV00 Latvija 
NL Netherlands NL31 Utrecht 
NL32 Noord-Holland 
NL33 Zuid-Holland 
NL41 Noord-Brabant 
NL42 Limburg (NL) 
PL Poland PL11 Lódzkie 
PL32 Podkarpackie 
PL33 Swietokrzyskie 
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PL41 Wielkopolskie 
PL51 Dolnoslaskie 
PT 
 
Portugal 
 
PT11 Norte 
PT15 Algarve 
PT16 Centro (PT) 
PT17 Lisboa 
PT18 Alentejo 
PT20 Região Autónoma dos Açores 
PT30 Região Autónoma da Madeira 
RO Romania RO11 Nord-Vest 
RO12 Centru 
RO21 Nord-Est 
RO22 Sud-Est 
RO31 Sud - Muntenia 
RO32 Bucuresti - Ilfov 
RO41 Sud-Vest Oltenia 
RO42 Vest 
SE Sweden SE11 Stockholm 
SE12 Östra Mellansverige 
SE21 Småland med öarna 
SE22 Sydsverige 
SE23 Västsverige 
SE31 Norra Mellansverige 
SE32 Mellersta Norrland 
SE33 Övre Norrland 
SI Slovenia SI01 Vzhodna Slovenija 
SI02 Zahodna Slovenija 
UK United 
Kingdom 
UKG1 Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Warwickshire 
UKG2 Shropshire and Staffordshire 
UKG3 West Midlands 
UKH1 East Anglia 
UKH2 Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire 
UKH3 Essex 
UKI1 Inner London 
UKI2 Outer London 
UKM2 Eastern Scotland 
UKM3 South Western Scotland 
UKM5 North Eastern Scotland 
UKM6 Highlands and Islands 
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Appendix 3 
Link between the size of the Brussels offices and the distribution of Structural funds 
The link between the size of the Brussels offices and the distribution of funds is not evident at 
first sight. In terms of budget, there is no statistically significant correlation between the 
office budget relative to the GDP per capita of the region – of, for that sake, to GDP tout court 
– and the amount of funds committed or paid to each region (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The link between Brussels office budgets and the allocation of regional funds 
(committed and paid). 
 
In terms of staff, there is a marginally negative association between the staff in the Brussels 
office relative to the GDP of the region and the amount of funds received (Figure 2). This 
association is, however, not statistically significant.  
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Figure 2. The link between Brussels office staff and the allocation of regional funds 
(committed and paid). 
 
 
Although, it could have been expected that bigger offices and better budgets would be in a 
better position to lobby European institutions than smaller offices, the simple linear 
connection between office size and the allocation of funds shows that this does not seem to be 
the case.  
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Appendix 4 
Variables included in the analysis 
Category  Variable Description Data source Expected 
effect 
Allocation of 
Structural 
funds 
(dependent 
variables) 
Committed 
funds 
Committed Structural funds 
at the beginning of the 
programming period 
relative to the GDP per 
capita in the region 
European 
Commission  
/ 
Paid funds Paid Structural funds 
relative to the GDP per 
capita in the region 
European 
Commission 
/ 
Regional 
offices 
Budget Budget of the regional 
office 
Author’s 
personal 
investigation 
+ 
Staff Staff in the office  Author’s 
personal 
investigation 
+ 
Economic 
criteria 
GDP per capita Regional GDP per capita Eurostat Regio 
database 
- 
Unemployment Regional unemployment 
rate 
Eurostat Regio 
database 
+ 
Density Population density in the 
region 
Eurostat Regio 
database 
- 
Institutional 
and political 
factors 
Corruption Perceived control of 
corruption 
Charron et al., 
2014 
- 
Self-rule Capacity of a regional 
government to exercise 
authority over those who 
live in its territory 
Hooghe et al., 
2008 
+ 
Shared-rule Capacity of a regional 
government to codetermine 
the exercise of authority for 
the country or the EU as a 
whole 
Hooghe et al., 
2008 
+ 
 
 
 
